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JURISDICTION
Appellants offer the following response to Respondent's claim
that this court lacks jurisdiction because Respondent's claim
raises new material not addressed in the appellants' initial brief.
Appellants have submitted to this Court a memorandum that sets
forth their argument in support of this Court's jurisdiction.
Below, that argument is set out in reply to Respondent's argument.
I.

THE ORTONS1 APPEAL IS NOT UNTIMELY BECAUSE THE PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE FINAL
AGENCY ACTION
The Ortons1 appeal to this court is not untimely because their

petition for judicial review was filed within thirty days of "the
order constituting final agency action."

Section 64-46b-14, Utah

Code Ann. Section 64-46b-14(3)(a) states:
A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued or is considered
to
have
been
issued
under
subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
Section 63~46b-14, Utah Code Ann.
Respondent contends that the final agency action occurred on
October 14, 1992, twenty days after appellants filed their motion
for

reconsideration.

See Brief of Respondent, at

2.

Respondent's position relies on § 6 3-46b-13 which states:
If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order
[granting or denying reconsideration] within
20 days after the filing of the request, the
request
for
reconsideration
shall
be
considered to be denied.

1

The

Section 63-46b-13(3)(b), Utah Code Ann.
It is undisputed that no response to appellants1 motion for
reconsideration was filed within twenty days of their request for
reconsideration. Instead, appellant contends that the Commission's
order responding to appellants' petition for reconsideration superseded the presumption created by § 6 3-46b-13.

It is this final

order, issued December 9, 1992, which amended the Commission's
original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision,
that appellants appeal from.
the final agency

action.

It is this order that was, in fact,
Upon the issuance of this order,

appellants had thirty days within which they could file a motion
for judicial review. Section 63-46b-14, Utah Code. Ann. See also
Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (appeal time commences when "final agency order"
issues).

Three factors support appellants' claim that the Order

issued on December 9, 1992 and not the Final Decision issued by the
Commission on September 4, 1992 was the final agency action from
which appeal could be taken.
First, the Order denying reconsideration made several amendments to the Commission's earlier Final Decision. While it is true
that the amendments affected only the Commission's finding of fact
and not its decision, the Order did amend the Commission's earlier
action.

The Commission made changes to its findings of fact and

then reiterated its first decision on the basis of those amended
findings of fact. See Order, attached as Exhibit 2. The petition
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for reconsideration was, therefore, granted in part and denied in
part.

Consequently, the Final Decision was superseded by the

agency's final order.

It was from this Order that the Ortons

appealed.
Second, the Commission's final Order is clearly the agency's
final formal action as it meets the requirements set by § 6 3-46b-10
of the Utah Code, for orders and decisions to be issued following
formal proceedings. That section states specific items which must
be included in an order to be filed by the presiding officer after
a formal adjudicative proceeding.

The section states that the

officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) A statement of the presiding officer's findings
of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in
the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially
noted;
(b)

A

statement

of

the

presiding

officer's

conclusions of law;
(c)

A statement of the reasons for the presiding

officer's decision;
(d)

A statement of any relief ordered by the

agency;
(e)

A

notice

of

the

reconsideration;

3

right

to

apply

for

(f)

A notice of any right to administrative or

judicial review of the order available to aggrieved
parties; and
(g)

The

time

limits

applicable

to

any

reconsideration or review.
Section 63-46b-10, Utah Code Ann.
The order issued by the Commission on December 9, 1992,
contains each of these items, with the exception of a notice of the
right to apply for reconsideration. See Order, attached as Exhibit
1. The order is therefore not simply a denial of reconsideration,
but is an official order issued following a formal adjudicative
proceeding

and constituting the agency's final action on the

parties1 petition for review.
Finally, the Commission acknowledged that the December 9 Order
was its final action, by giving notice to appellants that they had
30 days in which to file a request for judicial review. The notice
included in the Commission's final order states "You have thirty
(30) days after the date of the final order to file with the
Supreme Court a petition for judicial review." See Order, attached
as Exhibit

2.

The Commission then cites § 6 3-46b-13(l) and

§ 63-46b-14(2)(a) of the Utah Code.

The Commission was obviously

aware of the twenty-day presumption provided by § 63-46b-13. Their
final order was issued more than twenty days after their original
findings of fact, conclusions of law and final decision.

The

notation quoted above, therefore, can mean only that the court
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recognized the order responding to the motion for reconsideration,
and amending the earlier decision, to be its final action on the
Ortons1 case.

The Commission believed, as did the Ortons, that a

petition for judicial review could follow this final agency action.
The above factors, taken together, clearly indicate that the
Commission's

final action was to issue an order denying the

appellants1

motion

for

reconsideration.

As

noted

above,

§ 6 3-46b-14 requires that a petition for judicial review be filed
within thirty days of the "final agency action.11

Therefore, the

appellants1 petition was timely, being filed twenty-nine days after
the issuance of the Commission's order denying reconsideration.
This court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the Ortons1 appeal
from the Tax Commission's decision.
II.

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION TO BE
THE ACTION FROM WHICH APPEAL WAS TO BE TAKEN SECTION 6 3-46B-13
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO BAR THIS APPEAL WHERE THE AGENCY
ACTED ON THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Even if this court finds the Commission's Final Decision to be

the action from which appeal was to be taken § 6 3-46b-13 should not
be found to bar this appeal as the Tax Commission acted on the
petition for reconsideration.

It is not necessary for this court

to give § 63-46b-13 a strict interpretation in order to meet the
apparent

purposes

of

the

twenty-day

presumption.

A

strict

interpretation would compel an appellant to file for judicial
review before receiving a response from the agency.

Such a

requirement is not necessary where, as here, the agency would
suffer no prejudice as a result of a petitioner waiting for the
5

agency's final action on their case.
purposes

of

the

twenty-day

In the instant case, the

presumption

can

best

be met

by

recognizing the right of petitioners to await the agency's action
and to bring appeal from that final order.
A.

THE COMMISSION WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE
ORTONS1 DECISION TO WAIT FOR A RESPONSE TO
THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

There is no discussion in the notes to § 6 3-46b-13 or Utah
case law as to the purpose of the twenty-day presumption.

That

purpose, however, can not and should not be to force an appellant
to commence the appeal process without receiving response to their
motion.

Respondent

suggests

the

presumption

of

denial was

legislatively created in order to insure that the time for filing
an appeal could not be indefinitely
Respondent, at 2.

delayed.

See Brief of

This conclusion seems reasonable.

However, to

apply that purpose to bar the Ortons from seeking judicial review
is not reasonable. An agency to which a motion for reconsideration
has been made may at any time issue an order simply denying that
motion, and thereby commence the running of the thirty-day period
set

by

§ 63-46b-14.

Logically,

therefore,

the

twenty-day

presumption can not be for the purpose of aiding the agency, as the
agency

is solely

responsible

for

taking

final

action, on a

petitioner's motion. Because of this power, the agency may at its
discretion deny a motion for reconsideration in less than twenty
days. Given the agency's authority to move a case towards judicial
review, the presumption must be primarily for the benefit of the

6

appellant

who

wishes

to

seek

judicial

review

following

an

unfavorable final decision by the agency but who first wants a
reconsideration by the agency.

The twenty-day presumption allows

such a party to file for judicial review without having to wait for
the agency to issue an order which does nothing more than deny the
petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision.

Further, because

of the agency's power to issue a denial of reconsideration at any
time, the agency cannot be prejudiced by an appellant's decision to
wait for the final ruling.
the

twenty-day

In contrast, a strict application of

presumption

would

significantly

prejudice

petitioners who wait for a final response to their motion for
reconsideration and eventually receive one that amends the earlier
decision.
application

In light of the disparity in the effect of a strict
of

$ 6 3-46b-13 in this case, the court should

interpret that section to allow a petitioner to wait for the
agency's final action before commencing the appeal process.
Finally, to require an appellant to begin the appeal process
before the agency issues its final order creates the risk that two
actions could be proceeding simultaneously.

A strict interpreta-

tion of § 63-46b-13 creates the possibility that a motion for
reconsideration would be granted after a petition for judicial
review had been filed and the appeal process commenced.

Such a

situation would be duplicative and wasteful of judicial resources.
Using the timesaving presumption created by <? 6 3-46b-13 to bar
a party's appeal would thus be inequitable and wasteful.

7

The

inequity of such an application is especially evident in this case.
The Ortons filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1992, twenty days after the Tax Commission issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision.

Having presented

specific points in support of their motion for reconsideration, the
Ortons then waited for the Commission's response. The Ortons later
received a response from the Commission that did more than simply
deny reconsideration.

The Commission in fact amended its earlier

findings and entered a new order although without changing the
earlier decision.

The Commission thereby granted in part and

denied in part the motion for reconsideration. See Order, attached
as Exhibit 1. Following the Commission's final action, pursuant to
§ 6 3-46b-14 the Ortons filed a petition for judicial review of the
Commission's findings and decision.
Dismissal of the Ortons' appeal would give the agency's nonaction precedence

over

its actions

in amending

the original

findings of fact and issuing a final order denying reconsideration.
This court should not take such a position.

The Ortons filed a

timely petition for review when measuring from the date of the
agency's last actual action.

While the twenty-day presumption is

an effective method of facilitating review of agency action, it
should not supersede and render moot the agency's later decisions
to the detriment of petitioners.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Appellants believe there are no constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations the application of which
would be solely determinative of the outcome of this case.
statutes

and

rules

are, however,

directly

relevant

to

Some
the

disposition of appeal.
Statutes
Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-103(1)(1) (1992):
"Resident individual11 means:
(i) an individual who is domiciled in this state for any
period of time during the taxable year, but only for the
duration of such period; or
(ii) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and
spends in aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year
in this state . . . .
Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-543 (1992):
In any proceeding before the Commission under this
chapter, the burden of proof shall be upon the
petitioner . . . .
Utah Code Annotated j? 63-46b-16 (1989):
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings . . . .
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following:
. . . .

(d)
The agency has erroneously
applied the law; . . . .

9

interpreted or

(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that
is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
(h)

The agency action is:

(i) An abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute; . . .
(iv)

Otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Rules
Utah Administrative Code Rule 865-9-2(1)(D) (1992):
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has
a true, fixed, permanent home and principal
establishment, and to which place he has (whenever
he is absent) the intention of returning. It is
the place in which a person has voluntarily fixed
the habitation of himself and family, not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with the
present intention of making a permanent home.
After domicile has been established, two things are
necessary to create a new domicile:
first, an
abandonment of the old domicile; and second, the
intention and establishment of a new domicile. The
mere intention to abandon a domicile once established is not of itself sufficient to create a new
domicile; for before a person can be said to have
changed his domicile, a new domicile must be shown.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE FINDING OP THE TAX COMMISSION THAT WORTH
ORTON WAS DOMICILED IN UTAH WAS UNREASONABLE
AND AN IMPROPER INTERPRETATION OP THE LAW*
Given the established legal definition of the term "domicile"
and the entire record presented, the Tax Commission erred in
finding Worth Orton remained domiciled in Utah. This court should
review the Commission's finding under the correction of error stan10

dard because in light of prior judicial decisions, the Commission
erroneously interpreted statutory language. However, if this Court
finds that the correction of error standard is not applicable in
this case, then the Court should overturn the Commission's decision
as an unreasonable finding not supported by substantial evidence•
A.

The Proper Standard of Review of the
Interpretation of Law is Correction of Error.

Commission's

In light of the established legal definition of "domicile" the
Commission erred in finding Worth Orton had remained domiciled in
Utah during the years he lived in Nevada. The term "domicile" has
been frequently defined by courts from many jurisdictions.

See,

e.g. , Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978)
(stating and applying common law definition of domicile); Blessley
v. Blessley, 577 P.2d 62, 63 (N.M. 1978) (defining two factors to
be considered

in deciding domicile); Suglove v. Oklahoma Tax

Commfn, 605 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Okla. 1979) (citing and applying
"classic definition of domicile").

In fact, the definition relied

on by the Tax Commission and set out at Rule 865-9-2(1) (D), Utah
Administrative Code (1992) is simply a restatement of the common
law definition of that term.

See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.

(1979), at 435; 28 C.J.S. Domicile, § 1 (1941).

The Commission in

reaching residence decisions is, therefore, doing no more than
applying facts to established law.

The proper standard of review

for agency decisions interpreting or applying law is the correction
of error standard. See King v. Industrial Commln/ 209 Ut.Adv.Rpts.
33 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294,
11

1296 (Utah 1992); Morton International Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d
581, 588-89 (Utah 1991) .
Appellants recognize that under £ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), the
reviewing

court

is to provide the agencyfs

decision greater

deference if the state legislature has granted an agency discretion
in interpreting or administering the statute in question.

If such

discretion has been granted, the proper standard of review is the
See § 6 3-46b-16, Utah Code Ann.

abuse of discretion standard.
(1992).

Appellants contend, however, that no such grant of

discretion has been provided to the Tax Commission for the purpose
of interpreting established statutory definitions or prior case
law.

While the Respondent cites cases and statutes in support of

its claim to a grant of discretion, these statutes and decisions
are unpersuasive, in view of the fact that the Commission, in
reaching decisions regarding domicile, must do so in a manner
consistent with the legal definitions established by the courts
where the statutory definition is consistent with those decisions.
In such circumstances, the court is in as good a position as the
agency

to

determine

the meaning

of

the

statutory

language.

Therefore, this court should review the Commission's decision under
a correction of error standard granting no deference to the agency.
Even if this court finds the Commission has been granted
discretion in interpreting prior Utah decisions, statutory and
administrative

law, this

Court

the

Commission's

decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

In light of
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should

find

the evidence produced, it was not reasonable for the Commission to
conclude Worth Orton maintained the state of Utah as his domicile
during the time he lived in Nevada.
B.

Whatever the Standard of Review Applied by This Court, the
Commission's Decision is Not Supported by Substantial
Evidence.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. At the hearing on

this matter and in its brief, the Respondent made no effort to
challenge or rebut the Ortons» statement of the facts concerning
the last thirty-one years of their lives.

In view of the basic

agreement on the facts of this case, it is obvious the parties have
simply reached different conclusions as to Worth Ortonfs state of
residency.

Appellants

contend

Respondent

has

reached

an

unreasonable conclusion that is not supported by the evidence.
Worth

Ortonfs

actions

show

a

pattern

of

meeting

his

responsibilities and maintaining contacts with Utah, the state
where he lived for many years.
that

Worth

Orton

should

The Respondent seems to suggest

have

abandoned

these

contacts

and

responsibilities in order to demonstrate that he truly intended to
change his state of residence from Utah to Nevada. The Respondent
also suggests that Worth Orton should have acquired additional real
property in Nevada to indicate that he truly intended to remain in
that state, because thirty-one years of residing in the same county
in Nevada was insufficient to demonstrate residency in that state.
The facts presented at the hearing on this matter establish
Worth Orton continued to provide support for his wife although the
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couple lived apart. Despite the uncontradicted evidence concerning
the circumstances of the Ortonsf marriage, Worth did not obtain a
divorce because of family wishes and personal reasons.

He did,

however, continue to provide support to his wife and to maintain
two separate households.
The facts presented at the hearing also indicate that Worth
Orton chose to live inexpensively in Nevada so that he could
provide support to his wife.

He lived in a dormitory style

apartment near his place of employment during the entire time that
he worked in Mercury, Nevada.

Respondent has made the claim that

Worth Orton1s living accommodation was a dormitory, implying a
transitory residence.

The facts produced, however, indicate that

Worth Orton chose to live in an apartment complex which offered
maid service and access to prepared meals and not a "dormitory."
Because

the

rent

on

his

apartment

was

subsidized,

he paid

approximately twenty-one dollars per month to live there. The low
cost of these living accommodations allowed Worth Orton to provide
financial support to himself and his wife and to maintain both
households.

If Worth Orton had had a larger income or an indepen-

dent source of wealth, he may very well have purchased a second
home. However, in light of his needs and resources, the twenty-one
dollars per month dormitory style apartment was appropriate.
It is also true that Worth Orton chose to visit family and
friends in Utah at various times during each year. It is, however,
undisputed that he spent the majority of those visits at a cabin in

14

Parowan, Utah, which he jointly owned with a long-time friend.
Given the infrequency of these trips and the recreational purpose
of most of them, it is obvious that Worth Orton did not "commute"
from Mercury, Nevada to Parawon, Utah.
It is also agreed that Worth Orton retained ownership of
certain properties in Utah during the time he lived in Nevada.
However, that he did not maintain any of these properties for
residence purposes has been established by the evidence. Testimony
provided at the hearing established that Worth Orton1s wife lived
in the family home and that he rarely visited there.

Further,

after a number of years in Nevada, he transferred title to her
name.

Worth Orton also owned two parcels of property he had

inherited from his family and one piece of land he had purchased
for investment purposes but never developed.

The only other real

property in which he had an interest was the cabin in Parowan, Utah
that he jointly owned with a friend and which he visited during
various vacations.

These continuing connections do not indicate

that Worth Orton intended to retain his Utah domicile.

The

connections indicate only that Worth Orton retained certain ties to
the state of Utah during the time that he resided in Nevada.
The other points Respondent uses to support the Commission's
conclusion are minor and prove nothing about his state of domicile.
Where one obtains infrequent dental care and where one intends to
be interred are not of sufficient importance to counter the plain
evidence of Worth Orton's residence for more than twenty years in

15

Mercury, Nevada.

The evidence produced by the parties is, there-

fore, simply insufficient to support the conclusion that Worth
Orton remained a resident of Utah despite his stated intent to
abandon his Utah domicile and his more than twenty years of
residence in Nevada.
In addition, the Commission's decision is not supported by the
case law Respondent cites in defense of the finding that, despite
his decades-long residence in Nevada, Worth Orton never established
a domicile in that state.

The one case cited by Respondent in

support of its position on Worth Orton's residency is notably
unpersuasive.

In Blessley v. Blessley, 577 P.2d 62 (N.M. 1978),

the court considered the domicile of a soldier who lived in three
different states during his twenty-seven-year military career. In
that case, the court stated that the ultimate facts necessary to
sustain a conclusion of domicile are physical presence in a state
and intention to make that state one's home. IcL at 63. The court
also stated the well-established and directly applicable rule that
the domicile of Armed Forces personnel is not determined by where
they are stationed.

IcL

The court also expressed its belief that

military personnel should be allowed to purchase property where
they are stationed without being forced to abandon their former
domicile. Id.

at 64. Given this belief, the court would not force

a domicile change upon plaintiff Blessley who contended he had
never intended to change his domicile.
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Id. at 63.

The court's

decision turned primarily on the soldier's stated intention with
regard to his state of domicile.

Id.

In the present case, no such presumption regarding the effect
of re-location is applicable.

However, the factors cited by the

court—presence in a state and the intention of making that state
one's home—are applicable. Worth Orton has stated that his intent
was to change his domicile from Utah to Nevada and that he took
efforts to make that change. In addition, it is undisputed that he
was present in the state of Nevada and had a fixed home there for
more than twenty years.

The Blessley case is therefore easily

distinguishable from the facts of this case and is not supportive
of Respondent's position.

The Respondent relies on no other case

law to support its argument that Worth Ortonfs presence in Nevada,
his stated intention to become a resident of that state, and the
testimony provided are not sufficient to demonstrate he established
a Nevada domicile. Instead, Respondent relies only on its claim of
agency discretion to support the Commission's finding that Worth
Orton remained domiciled in Utah despite his presence in Nevada and
intent to change his domicile.
supported

by

the

evidence

That conclusion is not, however,

produced

by

the

parties.

The

Commission's decision, not being supported by substantial evidence,
must be overturned.
The

appellants

made

an

expanded

argument

Commission's decision in their initial brief.

against

the

As no new material

has been introduced by Respondents brief, appellants will simply
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reiterate their original argument by reference. Appellants contend
Worth Orton1s actions indicate his intention to establish himself
as a Nevada domiciliary.

Had Worth Orton been a wealthier man, he

might have purchased a Nevada home. Had he been a less responsible
man, he might have divorced and abandoned his wife. Partly because
he took neither of these actions, Worth Orton is claimed to have
remained

a Utah resident.

That claim, and the Commission's

conclusion that followed from it are not supported by the evidence.
This Court should, therefore, correct the Commission's error and
dismiss the assessment of taxes and interest against the Ortons.
II.
EVEN IS THIS COURT DETERMINES WORTH ORTON WAS
DOMICILED IN UTAH, THE COMMISSION ERRED IN
DETERMINING IT SHOULD NOT BE ESTOPPED PROM
ASSESSING TAXES AGAINST THE ORTONS FOR THE
PERIOD IN QUESTION.
In light of the facts produced in this case, the Commission
erred in determining it should not be estopped from assessing taxes
against the Ortons for the period in question. Worth Orton relied
on tax documents produced by the Tax Commission and 1980 representations by auditors in concluding he owed no Utah State taxes. The
finding of tax liability and collection from him of back taxes and
interest years after the tax was owed is indeed a detriment. Worth
Orton has saved for his retirement. He did not save to pay the Tax
Commission a debt its employees long ago found he did not owe.
Under the facts of this case, estoppel is justified.
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Beyond these

statements, appellants have nothing more to add to the argument in
their initial brief.
III.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO ABATE ALL
PRE-1988 INTEREST ACCRUALS.
The Commission erred in failing to abate all pre-1988 interest
accruals.

The Respondent claims appellants mis-characterized the

facts and law and asked for charity on the issue of interest
abatement.

As Respondent did not see fit to provide specifics in

support of its claim of mischaracterization, appellants cannot
answer this claim.

Appellants can, however, respond to the claim

they are seeking charity by stating that they seek only consistency
and fairness in asking for an abatement of the interest that
accrued as a result of the Tax Commission's mistakes.

Appellant

Worth Orton asks only that the Court exercise its equitable powers
to free him from the burden now imposed as a result of the Tax
Commission's lackadaisical, stumbling collection efforts.
It is not disputed that in 1980, the Tax Commission contacted
Worth Orton and told him he owed back taxes. After communications
with the Commission, Worth Orton was told that the matter would be
looked into and that someone would contact him again about the
debt.

Worth Orton was not contacted

again until 1988.

The

Commission suggests that during this nearly eight-year hiatus,
during which the Commission failed to inform him of his tax
liability, Worth Orton should have simply paid resident taxes to a
state other than the one in which he lived.
19

Such a suggestion is

not reasonable.

No taxpayer can expect the Tax Commission to

forego collection of taxes they are owed.

Worth Orton knew the

Commission had notice of the fact he was not paying Utah State
taxes.

Consequently,

he

could

reasonably

expect

that

the

Commission would inform him if they concluded, upon review, that he
should begin paying Utah income taxes. Appellants, therefore, do
not ask for charity from the Commission, only for an abatement of
interest that accrued as a result of the Commission's faulty
follow-up and collection procedures. Appellants contend that such
an abatement is proper and should be ordered on the same grounds as
the Commission's order abating post-1987 interest accruals.
Beyond these comments, appellants have nothing to add to the
argument in their initial brief.

All interest accruals prior to

January 1, 1988 should be abated.

Such an abatement would be fair

in light of the facts presented by this case.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above facts, appellants contend this Court
should apply a correction of error standard of review and overturn
the Commission's decision as an incorrect interpretation of the
law.

Even if this Court grants deference to the Commission's

decision, that decision should be overturned as not supported by
substantial evidence.

In addition, under the facts of this case,

estoppel could properly be applied to bar the Tax Commission's
assessment. Finally, even if this court does not grant estoppel in
appellants'

favor, an abatement of all
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interest

accruals is

justified as Worth Orton relied on the Tax Commission's findings in
choosing not to file Utah State tax returns during all the years in
question.
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